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It has been possible, since 1 April 
1996, by completing a single form or 
process, to obtain the protection of a 
trade mark throughout the fifteen 
countries of the European Union. The 
Community Trade Mark (CTM) is a 
booming and flourishing new system. By 
15 February 1998, more than 70,000 
trade mark applications had been 
received by the Alicante Office, 
exceeding even the most optimistic 
expectations.
The CTM is an «EC product governed 
mainly by two regulations:
  Council Regulation 40/94 on the 
Community Trade Mark (CTMR; OJ 
1994 LI 1/1); and
  Commission Regulation 2868/95
implementing Council Regulation
40/94 on the Community Trade Mark
(IR;OJ 1995 L303/1).
The CTM registration process is
completed by the different divisions of
the Office of Harmonisation for the
Internal Market (OHIM) and is wholly
under the control of a supervisory
authority, the Board of Appeal, which is
also based at the OHIM's premises in
Alicante, Spain.
According to CTMR, art. 130(1) the 
Boards of Appeals are:
'responsible Jor deciding on appeals from 
decisions of the examiners, Opposition 
Divisions, Administration of Trade Alarks and 
Legal Division and Cancellation Divisions.'
Article 131(2), CTMR adds that :
'the members of the Boards of Appeal shall
be independent. In their decisions they shall 
not be bound by any instructions.'
This paper does not aim to describe 
how this supervisory board functions but 
simply to review briefly the scope and 
content of the first decisions rendered by 
the Boards of Appeal by end April 1998.
In addition to their primary objectives, 
supervisory boards often have a very 
significant impact which is not expressly 
provided for in their basic texts: such 
authorities usually set the standard and 
dynamic of the instruments they control, 
just as a mentor might do. Does the same 
hold for the Boards of Appeal? Are they 
merely conservative controllers, or 
innovative supervisors willing to ensure 
that the CTM is a modern legal 
instrument?
The answer is both. The conservative 
approach seems to be supported by the 
fact that formalism in the registration 
process is essential to the CTM system. 
Notwithstanding this strict and classical 
approach of the law, the Boards of Appeal 
seem willing to demonstrate that, aso
stated by law, they are an authority 
intellectually independent from the 
OHIM. In fact, the Boards of Appeal do 
not appear to be a passive controller of 
the legality of the CTM system, but have 
instead indicated their aim to be a pro- 
active partner of the companies which 
register trade marks and thus to
O
contribute, as fully as possible, to the 




The first cases submitted to the Boards 
of Appeal allowed them to reaffirm that 
the granting of a CTM was subject to a 
minimum of formalities, in particular, 
with respect to payment of administrative 
fees (s. 1(1)) and to the representation of 
the sign which an applicant wishes to 
protect (s. 1(2)). By insisting on the need 
to respect these formalities, one can 
conclude that the Boards of Appeal value 
the CTMs and their applicants highly. 
The CTM provides a Europe-wide legal 
monopoly for a potentially indefinite
period of time and such a right cannot be1 o
granted lightly. The credibility of the 
system and the protection of third 
parties' rights depend on it.
Fee must be paid in time
In the very first case submitted to the 
Boards of Appeal, an issue arose as to the 
consequences resulting both from the 
failure to file an appeal and from the 
non-payment ot the appeal fee within the 
two-month time period specified in 
CTMR, art. 59.
The facts of this case are simple: the 
OHIM denied a person the right to be 
listed as an authorised representative to 
the OHIM and notified this refusal to the 
representative by lax. This notification 
was dated 25 October 1996 and the 
representative filed an appeal by fax on 
27 December 1996, (i.e. two months and 
one day after the date on which the 
refusal had itself been sent) whereby it 
requested the OHIM to draw the appeal 
fee directly from their account
The Board of Appeal logically applied 
IR, r. 70 and 72, which specify the rules 
for calculating time limits for the CTM 
legislation, and therefore rejected the 
appeal. This solution is clear and does 
not give raise to any other comment.
Representation must be attached
CTMR, art. 26(l)(d) states that 'an 
application for a CTM shall contain a 
representation of the trade mark', this 
representation should be attached to the 
application form.
The other basic formal requirement 
was expressly reaffirmed in two decisions 
of 21 January 1998 and of 12 February 
1998 arising from appeals involving 
applicants failing to send proper 
representation of their trade marks with 
their applications. Because of this failure 
to send the necessary representations of 
the trade marks, the examiners of the 
OHIM refused to grant the applicants a 
filing date, which is the starting point ol 
all CTM registrations.
In particular, in the decision of 12 
February 1998   the Orange decision   
the applicant claimed protection for a 23
colour but did not enclose a description 
of it. Instead, it simply indicated that it 
wanted the protection for the colour 
'orange'!
Based upon CTMR, art. 26(1 )(d) and 
IR, r. 9(l)(a)(iv), the Board of Appeal 
decided that if the applicant wished to 
claim protection for a colour, the mark 
should be reproduced on a sheet of paper 
separate from the sheet on which the text 
of the application appears, in the form 
described in detail in the CTM 
legislation, and that in the case of 
registration in colour, the colours makingo ' o
up the mark should also be indicated.
Consequently the Board of Appeal 
approved the examiner's decision 
refusing to grant the applicant a filing 
date. It considered that:
'according to Article 21 CTMR and Rule 
9(2) IR, this minimum requirement has to be 
met in order to obtain a filing date. If the 
deficiency is not remedied, the application 
shall not be dealt with as a Community trade 
mark application by the Office.'
It added that:
'these legal requirements also conform with 
the principle of certainty, which is a guiding 
principle in the system of law governing the 
Community trade mark, since the latter is 
based on registration. According to this 
principle, the content oj a trade mark 
application must be determined unequivocally 
from the outset, that is to say, it must reveal 
what, according to the intention of the 
applicant, is to be the subject matter of the 
protection flowing from the requested trade 
mark ... From this follows further that, as a 
rule, the trade mark must be pictorially 
represented if the applicant claims any special 
graphic feature or, as in the present case, a 
colour. This is an imperative necessity for 
conducting the examination and registration 
procedure, including the search, and is 
commanded by the interests of the public and 
all owners of registered rights such as, for 
example, the owners of earlier trade mark 
rights who wish to determine the scope oj 
protection of the application.'
In fact, it is not only in the interest of 
the owners, if any, of prior trade mark 
rights that the scope of protection should 
be clearly specified, but more generally it 
is in the interest of any holder (owner, 
licensee, permitted user, etc.) of rights 
which could conflict with a CTM, such as 
copyright, design, company name to 
mention but a few. Moreover, even those 
with no rights need to know the exact 
scope of the protection afforded to the
trade marks of third parties. This 
knowledge will help assess what is 
allowed and what is prohibited by CTM 
legislation.o
A similar position was adopted in the 
decision of 21 January 1998 (see OJ 
OHIM, 3/1998, 181), that involved a 
trade mark consisting of the vacuumo
packing of an article of clothing in a 
plastic envelope where the representation 
of the mark was not filed. In this case, the 
Board of Appeal considered that:
'the furnishing of a representation of the 
mark is one of the few elements of information 
necessary to obtain a filing date. Towards this 
end, the Implementing Regulation sets out 
how certain marks should be graphically 
represented. Rule 3(2) IR,for example, 
requires that, when the mark is not a word 
mark, but a three-dimensional, colour or 
other type of mark, a reproduction of the mark 
be submitted on a sheet of paper separate from 
the sheet on which the text of the application 
appears. Therefore, the trade mark in 
question, in order to have been accorded a 
filing date, should have been reproduced. A 
mere description, not conveying the clear and 
precise appearance of the mark itself, cannot 
be considered to be a reproduction.'
The Board of Appeal simply referred 
to IR, r. 3(4) which provides that where 
registration of a three-dimensional mark 
is applied for, the application shall 
contain a representation that shall consist 
of a photographic reproduction or a 
graphic representation. The latter terms, 
according to the Board of Appeal, must 
be understood as meaning a drawing and 
such like representations.
Finally, in the Orange decision, the 
Board of Appeal ruled that the receipt 
issued by the OHIM pursuant to IR, 
r. 5(1) when it receives an application:
'constitutes only an acknowledgement that 
certain documents have been received and is 
not a communication on the completeness of 
the filed documents.'
In that respect, it happened that the 
OHIM did not trace documents allegedly 
sent by the applicants. In such a case, the 
Board of Appeal ruled that the onus is on 
the applicant to establish, on the balance 
of probabilities, that an application for a 
CTM containing the information 
specified in the CTMR, has been filed 
with the OHIM or, as the case may be, 
with the central OHIM of a member state 
or with the Benelux Trade Mark Office 
(see Board of Appeal decision of 29 April 
1998, Procter <$L Gamble Co, not vet
published). The Board of Appeal added 
that it is up to the applicant to take 
whatever precautions are necessary to 
ensure that the relevant documents are 
sent to and received by the OHIM.
DEMONSTRABLE 
INDEPENDENCE
The issue of the status of the Board of 
Appeal and, in particular, its 
independence within the OHIM system 
is still not clear. Is the Board of Appeal 
comparable to a judicial court, or are 
they simply an extension of the OHIM?
Notwithstanding the foregoing issue,o o o '
from a professional standpoint and for 
the credibility of the CTM, it seems 
important that the Board of Appeal 
appears to the companies (applicants or 
opponents) and to the community trade 
marks courts as a reliable judicial 
reference body; and not simply an 
additional administrative recourse 
involving loss of time and money.
Appealing to the Board of Appeal 
should be seen by companies as a real and 
effective possibility to assert their rights 
and, at least, to be heard by a neutral 
authority and be given a new opportunity 
to convince the OHIM of the companies' 
position.
The first cases before the Boards of 
Appeal on formal requirements show 
that there is no systematic hostility 
against the policy developed by the other 
departments of the OHIM. However the 
Board of Appeal are not bound by the 
doctrine of the OHIM. They confirmed 
this elementary principle of EC law in the 
Fuji decision of 11 March 1998 (not yet 
published). In this case, a CTM 
application was made in respect of the 
letters 'IX' in plain type for certain goods 
and services related to photographic 
material and photographic processing. 
Upon examination as to absolute 
grounds, the examiner, by letter dated 21 
October 1997, indicated to the applicant 
that the letters 'IX' were not eligible for 
registration because they did not comply 
with CTMR, art. 7(1 )(b) to the extent 
that, in his view, they merely consisted of 
two non-distinctive letters. The letter did 
not offer any explanation as to why the 
examiner considered a trade mark 
consisting 'of solely two non-distinctive 
letters "IX"' did not comply with CTMR, 
art. 7(1 )(b). The examiner referred to 
para. 8.3 of the examination guidelines of 
the OHIM in his letter to the applicant 
with his final decision. That paragraph
contains the following statement:o
'A trade mark consisting of one or two 
letters or digits, unless represented in an 
unusualJashion, would, except in special 
circumstances, be devoid of distinctive 
• character ...'
In addition it appears that the 
correspondence from the examiner in 
this case offers no explanation for finding 
the mark 'IX' for photographic goods or 
services to be devoid of distinctiveness 
nor can any reason be implied even in 
response to the various points put 
forward by the applicant.
The appellant contested this decision 
and claimed that CTMR, art. 4, provides 
that a CTM may consist of any sign 
capable of being represented graphically, 
particularly words, including personal 
names, designs, letters, numerals, the 
shape of goods or their packaging, 
provided that such signs are capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of 
one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings. The above is, of course, 
subject to CTMR, art. 7, that sets out the 
type of signs or trade marks that should 
be refused on absolute grounds. Amongo o
them are trade marks which are devoid of 
any distinctive character.
The Board of Appeal ruled that:
'Articles 4 and 7 CTMR, when read 
together, place the onus on the examiner to 
show, where he so asserts, how a trade mark 
lacks distinctiveness.'
Therefore it:
'requires the examiner to exercise his 
discretion, the Examination Guidelines should 
not be regarded as having the force of binding 
rules but rather as useful aids which should be 
taken into account among other things, in 
particular the relevant provisions of the Basic 
Regulation, case law, the competing interests 
which vary in weight from case to case and the 
specific circumstances of the case, when 
reaching a decision. The decision in turn 
should reflect the considerations which were 
taken into account. Furthermore, Article 73 
CTMR, first sentence, requires that decisions 
of the OHIM shall state the reasons on which 
they are based. Having regard to the
foregoing, the Board, in allowing the Appeal, 
considers that the contested decision should be 
set aside and the case remitted to the examiner
jor further prosecution.'
In this decision, the Board of Appeal 
correctly exercised its power to sanction, 
as ultra vires, CTM decisions made by the 
OHIM.
The Board of Appeal, in its decision, 
recalled that the OHIM should abide by 
the general principle of motivation of 
decisions set forth in art. 190 of the EC 
Treaty. This is consistent with the case 
law of the European Court of Justice 
which recently cancelled a decision of the 
European Commission because it had 
merely stated its conclusion, and not 
specified the reasons that led to its 
conclusion (see Interporc Im- Und Export 
GmbH v EC Commission (Case T-124/96) 
ECR 11-125).
The Board of Appeal also looked to the 
principle of hierarchy among the 
community texts, i.e. that whereas 
informal guidelines could be used to 
clarify a higher text, they should never 
derogate from it. In other words they 
reiterated that trade mark practice is 
governed by the rules set forth in the 
CTMR and IR and that each decision is 
to be examined on a case by case basis 
without bias against any particular type of 
sign. This solution also conformed with 
European case law which has consistently 
held that an implementing regulation 
cannot derogate from the provisions of 
the basic regulation to which it is 
subordinated (Deutsche Tradax GmbH v 
Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle filr Getreide und 
Futtermittel (Case 38/70) [1971] ECR 
145).
Upon receipt of the Fuji decision, the 
OHIM immediately reconsidered its 
official position and indicated that the 
examination guidelines will be amended 
accordingly. This prompt reaction is 
certainly fair and welcome. At least, it 
shows that the OHIM accepts that it may 
have been wrong to adopt certain 
positions and that, when necessary, it is 
prepared to change its position and to 
thus contribute to the new challenges 
raised by an evolving and competitive 
market.
One may simply regret that, in light of 
the principle of economy of procedure 
developed by the Board of Appeal in 
another matter (see below), it has not 
ruled directly on the merits of the Fuji 
case.
CONTRIBUTION TO CTM 
CASE LAW
It is submitted that one of the keys to 
the success of the CTM lies in the ability 
of this new legal instrument to respond 
to the needs of companies that have to 
face the challenges of the third 
millennium, particularly exacerbated
competition where 'image' and 'goodwill' 
will be essential to business success (see 
Eric Gastinel, 'Les licences de goodwill: un 
substitut de la franchise 1 , Les Petites Affiches 
1994, No. 27, at p. 16).
To attain this objective, companies will 
need to deal with an OHIM which is 
aware that the role and use of trade 
marks is developing and that having 
resort exclusively to trade mark law is not 
the only way to assert distinctiveness, but 
that slavish copying can also be legally 
prevented by tortious actions or unfair 
competition.
Obtaining a CTM is a not the only way 
to protect a trade mark throughout the 
EU. One should not forget that similarly 
wide protection can still be achieved 
through domestic and international 
registrations. This means that companies 
could be tempted to avoid using the 
OHIM and the CTM if a satisfactory 
response to their business needs can be 
found in quicker and cheaper ways. It is 
well-known that companies often apply 
for trade marks when the products or 
services concerned are in their ultimate 
launching phases and sometimes only a 
few days before commercial launches. 
This is something which the OHIM 
should never forget.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the 
ultimate purpose of a trade mark office is 
to police trade mark law   unless it is 
required to do so, for instance, through 
opposition procedure. Domestic actions, 
in particular before the community trade 
marks courts, seem to be the proper way 
to resolve disputes of this kind.
In light of this, companies should find 
in the OHIM an ally rather than a new 
non-productive administrative body. To a 
certain extent, the applicants are clients 
of the OHIM. They pay for a quality legal 
service.
In that respect the Board of Appeal has 
the opportunity to contribute favourably 
to achieving these expected results by 
setting forth clear and innovative CTM 
rules and principles and giving a moral 
and legal impetus to the success of this 
new community instrument.
The Orange decision was the first 
opportunity for the Boards of Appeal to 
give the OHIM that dynamic impulse. 
This appeal simply related to the filing 
date issue. However the Board of Appeal 
considered, in the exercise of the judicial 
discretion conferred on it by CTMR, art. 
62(1) whether the court itself should 25
decide on the merits of the application.
In its decision, although colours are 
not expressly mentioned in CTMR, art. 4 
in the list of signs in which a CTM may 
consist, the Board of Appeal ruled that 
'it is true that a colour per se may be 
generally protectable as a Community 
Trade Mark under CTMR, art. 4'.
However, as a rule, its registration can 
be precluded by the absolute grounds of 
refusal laid down in CTMR, art. 7(1 )(b), 
(c) or (d), unless it is, for example, a very 
specific colour shade for very specific 
goods or services or the applicant can 
successfully argue that the trade mark has 
become distinctive in consequence of the 
use which has been made of it (art. 7(3), 
CTMR).
In the Orange case, the Board of Appeal 
specifically determined that:
'the appellant jailed to comply with these 
requirements when it attached to its 
application only a sheet of paper with a 
description of the claimed colour in writing, 
using only the relatively vague term "orange" 
without specifying this any further or listing a 
code, and without attaching to the application 
any explicit figurative reproduction of the 
colour ... since an uncountable number of 
different colour shades, ranging in the specific 
case from dark to light and from the yellowish 
to the reddish tones, are conceivable which 
would all fall under the wide generic term 
"orange ".'
To justify its approach, the Board of 
Appeal explained that:
'it might have appeared reasonable, on 
grounds of economy of procedure, having 
regard to the appellant's interest as well as the 
public interest, that these matters were 
examined by the Board of Appeal, since it 
would be pointless to litigate — in possibly 
lengthy proceedings — on the filing date if the 
application for a Community trade mark were 
bound to fail ultimately on absolute grounds. 
However, taking into account the submissions 
of the appellant, the circumstances of the 
present case and also the novelty of the 
Community trade mark system, the Board 
deemed it appropriate to disregard arguments 
of procedural economy at the present stage in 
order to permit the appellant to avail itself 
fully of the various procedures and in order to 
allow for an exhaustive examination of the 
case.'
This means that in the future the 
Board of Appeal will be entitled to review 
and expressly decide on issues raised by 
the CTM applications that are expressly 
submitted to their review by the
appellants or opponents. However, the 
review should cover only aspects of the 
CTM applications that are considered 
public order issues such as review of 
absolute grounds for refusal, other 
administrative issues such as payment of 
taxes, completion of formalities with 
time-limits or motivation of decisions. In 
contrast, this automatic control should 
not cover issues relating to personal 
aspects of the CTM applications such as 
relative ground for refusal, i.e. prior 
rights.
From a colour trade mark standpoint, 
the solution reached by the Board of 
Appeal in the Orange decision found a 
favourable echo within the internal 
doctrine of the OHIM which 
subsequently announced its intention to 
publish for registration the 'lilac' colour 
which is used in connection with the 
well-known colour of the Milka cow.
The issue for the future is whether the 
OHIM will accept signs which are not 
traditionally accepted trade mark signs, 
such as sounds or odours. An element of 
response to this question may be the 
following: can the sign for which ao o
protection is claimed be represented in a 
graphical manner so that any third party 
can reproduce it in a identical way simply 
using the description set forth in the 
publication? If so, why can't the sign be 
protected as a CTM if it meets the other 
requirements for protection specified in 
the CTM legislation?
CONCLUSION
The first decisions of the Board of 
Appeal provide us with a flavour of what 
the CTM system could be. For the 
future, many legal issues relating to the 
CTM remain unclear. One of the relevant 
issues will be in determining the scope of 
control of the Boards of Appeal's 
decisions by the European Court of 
Justice. In a recent chronicle concerning 
a similar authority (see 'la procedure 
centralisee du droit communautaire 
d'autorisation de mise sur le marche des 
medicaments', Revue Trimestrielle du 
Droit Europeen, 1997 en 3, at p. 443), it 
was suggested that the Court should have 
a limited amount of control over 
decisions of the European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products.
As specified in CTMR, art. 63, the 
court should of course control the 
competence of the Boards of Appeal, 
whether the decision process infringed 
an essential procedural requirement (i.e.
ensure that the defences' rights of the 
parties have been respected, and that the 
decision is properly motivated), whether 
there was any misuse of power and finally 
whether the decision rendered infringed 
the EC legal system applicable to CTMs. 
Thus, it is concluded that most probably 
this latest ground would be that with the 
greatest chance of success.
In light of EC case law, it is considered 
that the legal review by the ECJ should be 
confined to examining whether the 
decision contained a manifest error or 
constituted a misuse of power or whether 
the authority clearly exceeded the bounds 
of its discretion (see Balkan-Import Export, 
(Case 55/75) [1976] ECR, at p. 19). This 
review implies that the decision should 
be sufficiently reasoned to allow the 
court to control its content.
One can see no reason why the 
solution proposed for marketing 
authorisations of medicinal products as 
applied in various business sectors should 
not apply to the Boards of Appeal's 
decisions as well.
There is no doubt that the Boards of 
Appeal will also deal with issues involving 
rather complex economical and technical 
situations. Furthermore, it is stressed 
that the members of the Boards of 
Appeal are senior trade marks specialists 
appointed by the council, and not laymen 
(see CTMR, art. 130(2)). Therefore, one 
could assume that decisions of the Boards 
of Appeal, i.e. constituted by three 
members for each board, have the 
potential to be equitable and satisfactorily 
reasoned in all respects.
Consequently, it is believed that the 
Boards of Appeal should be allowed the 
opportunity to define their lines of 
action, as this will ultimately have a direct 
and material impact on the success of 
CTM and its credibility. ™
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